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VVhat will the result be the next time the U.S. Supreme Court faces
physician-assisted suicide?

The future
of physician-assisted
suicide
Yale Kamisar
I believe that when the Supreme Court opinions-which contained strong lanhanded down its decisions in 1997 in guage that could be used effectively to adWashington v. Glucksberg 1 and Vacca v. vance the PAS cause in op-ed pieces, talk
Quill,Z proponents of physician-assisted shows, state legislatures, and state courts.
suicide (PAS) suffered a much greater setThen, the U.S. Supreme Court entered
back than many of them are able or willing the fray. It disagreed with the lower federal
to admit.
courts virtually point by point and in effect
When, in 1996 within one month, the eradicated all the lower courts' forceful and
U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and felicitous language.4
Second Circuits became the first two U.S.
Nor is that all. The constitutional arguappellate courts to hold that there was a ments that proponents of PAS made withright to assisted suicide under any cir- out success in the Supreme Court and the
cumstances,3 they generated a good deal of policy arguments they have been making,
momentum in favor of PAS. The fact that and will continue to make, in the state legthere was no dissent in the Second Circuit islatures or state courts or on the op-ed
case and the Ninth Circuit decision was pages greatly overlap. There are only so
supported by a large majority (8-3) con- many arguments in favor of a "right" to
tributed to this momentum. So did the di- PAS, and almost all were addressed by the
rectness and forcefulness of the majority Court in the Glucksberg and Quill cases.
The Court, for example, considered the folYale Kamisar is the Clarence Darrow lowing arguments:
Distinguished University Professor of
1. Withdrawal of life support is nothing
Law, University ofMichigan. This article more or less than assisted suicide; there is
is adapted from a longer article to be no significant moral or legal distinction bepublished in the Minnesota Law Review. tween the two.
(Yale Kamisar, On the Meaning and Impact
2. There is no meaningful difference beof the Physician-Assisted Suicide Cases, tween administering palliative drugs with
MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 1998).)
the knowledge that they are likely to has48

ten the patient's death and prescribing a
lethal dose of drugs for the very purpose of
killing a patient.5
3. The 1990 Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department ofHealth case6 was not
simply about the right to forgo unwanted
medical treatment; it was really about personal autonomy and the right to control
the time and manner of one's death.
4. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
protects one's right to make intimate and
personal choices, such as those relating to
marriage, procreation, child rearing-and
the time and manner of one's death. As the
Ninth Circuit observed, quoting from
Planned Parenthood v. Casey: "Like the decision [whether] to have an abortion, the
decision how and when to die is one of 'the
most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime,' a choice 'central to personal dignity and autonomy."' 7
A majority of the Court, I think it's fair
to say, did not find any of the arguments
summarized above convincing. 8 Thus,
these arguments have lost a considerable
amount of credibility and will be easier to
rebuff when made again, albeit in a different setting.

TONY STONE WORLDWIDE

I am well aware that in both Glucksberg
and Quill Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
provided the fifth vote to make Chief Justice William Rehnquist's opinions the opinions of the Court-by stating that she
joined Rehnquist's opinion, yet writing
separately. I am aware, too, that in large
measure, Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg
and Stephen Breyer joined O'Connor's
opinion.
However, there is no clear indication in
O'Connor's brief concurring opinion that
she found any of the principal arguments
made by PAS proponents any more persuasive than Rehnquist did. There is no
suggestion, for example, that she reads
the Cruzan opinion any more broadly
than Rehnquist does or that she interprets
the stirring language in Casey any more
expansively.
Nor is there any suggestion that she has
any more difficulty accepting the distinction between forgoing life-sustaining medical treatment and actively intervening to
bring about death. Nor is there any reason

to think that she has more trouble grasping the "double effect" principle (the principle that explains why a doctor forbidden
to administer a lethal dose of drugs for the
very purpose of killing a patient may increase the dosage of medication needed to
relieve pain even though the increased
dosage is likely to hasten death or increase
its risk).
Indeed, in one respect at least, O'Connor
may have gone a step further than Rehnquist. She may be saying-she is certainly
implying-that the "double effect" principle is not only plausible but necessary.
Her position (and Breyer's) seems to be
that if, for example, a state were to prohibit the pain relief that a patient desperately
needs when the increased dosage of medication is so likely to hasten death or cause
unconsciousness that, according to the
state, the procedure smacks of assisted suicide or euthanasia, she (presumably along
with Breyer and Ginsburg) would want to
revisit the question.
I realize that the Supreme Court's fail-

The legal issues surrounding physicianassisted suicide are still very much alive.

ure to recognize a constitutional right to
PAS, even under the most restricted conditions, does not prevent one from arguing
that there is a common law right, a state
constitutional right, or a "moral" or "political" right, to PAS. But it will be a good deal
harder to engage in any kind of "rights
talk" after the Supreme Court decisions
than before.
I liked the result in the 1997 cases. Nevertheless, I have to agree with those commentators-many of whom were quite unhappy with the result-who believe that
the Court will revisit the issue in the next
5 or 10 years. Unlike a goodly number of
other Court watchers, however, I very
much doubt that the next time the Court
confronts the issue the result will be any
different. There were a number of factors
at work when the Court decided the 1997
PAS cases, and most of them will still be
49
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The strong opposition of the American Medical Association
is bound to influence some justices in future cases.
operating when the Court addresses the
issue a second time.
For one thing, assisted suicide and other
issues related to death and dying have been
the subject of vigorous debate in recent
years, and there is little reason to think this
agitation will subside in the foreseeable future. For another thing, the rights of a politically vulnerable group are not at stakeas had been the situation when the Court
intervened in prior instances. 9
O'Connor put it well, I think, when, reiterating a point she had made during the
oral arguments, 10 she observed:
Every one of us at some point may be affected
by our own or a family member's terminal illness. There is no reason to think the democratic process will not strike the proper balance
between the interests of terminally ill, mentally competent individuals who would seek to
end their suffering and the state's interests in
protecting those who might seek to end life
mistakenly or under pressure. 11

Another likely reason for the Court's reluctance to establish a constitutionally protected right to, or liberty interest in, assisted suicide, and one that will apply the
next time around as well as it did the first
time, is capsuled in the solicitor general's
amicus brief: Once an exception to the
general prohibition against PAS is mandated by the Court, however heavily circumscribed it might be at first, "there is no
obvious stopping point." 12
Thus, Rehnquist noted Washington
state's insistence that the impact of the
Ninth Circuit's decision-invalidating the
state's assisted-suicide ban "only 'as applied
to competent, terminally ill adults who
wish to hasten their deaths by obtaining
medication prescribed by their doctors"'''will not and cannot be so limited." 13 Then,
he observed:
The [Ninth Circuit's] decision, and its expansive reasoning, provide ample support for the
State's concerns. The court noted, for example, that the "decision of a duly appointed surrogate decision maker is for all legal purposes
the decision of the patient himself"; that "in
some instances, the patient may be unable to

50

self-administer the drugs and ... administration by the physician ... may be the only way
the patient may be able to receive them"; and
that not only physicians, but also family members and loved ones, will inevitably participate
in assisting suicide. Thus, it turns out that
what is couched as a limited right to "physician-assisted suicide" is likely, in effect, a much
broader license, which could prove extremely
difficult to police and contain."

Although concurring, Justice Ginsburg
neither joined Rehnquist's opinion nor
wrote an opinion of her own; 15 during the
oral arguments she voiced skepticism that
any right to PAS, no matter how narrowly
limited initially, could or would be confined to the terminally ill or could or would
stop short of active voluntary euthanasia.
When Kathryn Tucker, lead attorney for
the plaintiffs in Glucksberg, urged the
Court to recognize, or to establish, a constitutionally protected liberty interest "that
involves bodily integrity, decisional autonomy, and the right to be free of unwanted
pain and suffering," 16 Ginsburg retorted
that "a lot of people would fit [this] category," not just the terminally illY How, she
wondered, do you "leave out the rest of the
world who would fit the same standards"?18
At another point, Ginsburg suggested
that the patient who is so helpless or in so
much agony that she "is not able to assist
in her own suicide," but must have a health
professional administer a lethal injection,
is "in a more sympathetic situation" than
one who is able to commit suicide with the
preliminary assistance of a physician. 19
Position of medical groups
Still another factor must have had some
impact on at least some members of the
Court and is bound to influence at least
some of the justices in future cases. That
factor is the strong opposition of the American Medical Association (AMA) and other
medical groups to the constitutionalization
or legalization of PAS (regardless of how
narrowly limited the constitutional right
or the statutory authorization might be).
As New York Times reporter Linda Green-

house has pointed out, 20 the amicus brief
filed by the AMA in Glucksberg and Quill
sharply contrasted with the one filed seven
years earlier in Cruzan.
In Cruzan, the AMA told the Court that,
under the circumstances, terminating life
support was in keeping with respect for
"the patient's autonomy and dignity." 21 In
Glucksberg and Quill, however, the AMA
(and more than 40 other national and state
health care organizations) told the Court
• "the ethical prohibition against physician-assisted suicide is a cornerstone of
medical ethics";
• the AMA had repeatedly "reexamined
and reaffirmed" that ethical prohibition
and had done so as recently as summer
1996;and
• "physician-assisted suicide remains
'fundamentally incompatible with the
physician's role as healer, would be difficult
or impossible to control, and would pose
serious societal risks."'22
Recent and continuing trends in medical practice may only heighten the AMA's
resistance to PAS. The next time the issue
is presented, the AMA and other medical
groups might well argue that new trends
and developments make the need to maintain the absolute prohibition against PAS
more important than ever. It would not be
surprising if the next time around the AMA
were to underscore the point recently
made by two commentators:
Given the great pressures threatening medical
ethics today-including, among other factors,
a more impersonal practice of medicine, the
absence of a lifelong relationship with a physician, the push toward managed care, and the
financially based limitation of services-a
bright line rule regarding medically-assisted
death is a bulwark against disaster."

Legislative conundrum
Another factor at work in the assisted
suicide cases, and one that will operate as
well the next time the Court confronts the
issue, is the justices' realization that if they
were to establish a right to assisted suicide,
however limited, the need to enact legisla-
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tion implementing and regulating any tablish this right, PAS opponents would
such right would generate many problems. fight hard to include a "family approval"
These inevitably would find their way back provision in any legislation regulating assisted suicide.
to the Court.
They would also want mandatory waitWhether a regulatory mechanism would
be seen as providing patients and physi- ing periods, specified information and
cians with much-needed protection or procedures to ensure that the decision to
viewed as unduly burdening, the underly- choose PAS is "truly informed," and all
ing right to assisted suicide would be large- sorts of notification requirements and bans
ly in the eye of the beholder. Thus, it is not on the use of public facilities, public emsurprising that proponents of PAS even disagree among themselves as to how a particular procedural requirement should be
regarded.
For example, three of the nation's most
Anational survey found that although
a substantial proportion of physicians
respected proponents of PAS, Franklin
Miller, Howard Brody, and Timothy Quill,
have received requests from patients for
have questioned the desirability of the 15lethal injections or prescriptions to hasday waiting period required by the Oregon
ten death, few have complied with their
Death with Dignity Act. This provision was
patients' wishes.
designed to ensure that a patient's decision
In 1996, researchers from Mount
to elect assisted suicide is resolute. 24 AcSinai School of Medicine, New York; the
cording to Miller, Brody, and Quill, this "arUniversity of Chicago; and the Univerbitrary time period ... may be highly bursity of Rochester, New York, sent quesdensome for patients who are suffering
tionnaires to 3,102 physicians practicintolerably and may preclude access to asing in 10 specialties in which doctors
sisted death for those who request it at the
are most likely to receive requests for
point when they are imminently dying."25
assisted suicide. Sixty-one percent of
The same three commentators have also
those surveyed responded. The results
criticized a provision of a Model State Act
were published in the April23, 1998,
requiring that the discussion between
issue of The New England Journal of
physician and patient concerning a request
Medicine.
for assisted suicide be witnessed by two
Eleven percent of physicians said that
adults. 26 They called it "unduly intrusive
under current legal constraints there
and unlikely to be effective."27
were circumstances in which they
On the other hand, they maintain that
would prescribe a fatal dose of medicaan Oregon provision requiring a second
tion to hasten a patient's death. Seven
medical opinion on the decision is "not a
percent said they would provide a lethal
reliable safeguard" because it "does not
injection.
mandate that the consulting physician be
Eighteen percent of the physicians
genuinely independent."28
said they have received requests from a
Perhaps the most rigorous condition on
patient to hasten death. Sixteen percent
PAS to be found is the requirement of
of the physicians receiving such reCompassion in Dying that the approval of
quests, or 3 percent of the entire samall the would-be-suicide's immediate fample, have prescribed a fatal dose of medily members be obtained.29 (This organizaication. Five percent of the entire
tion provides professionals to help termisample have given at least one lethal innally ill people commit suicide. It was also
.. jection. All tol<i, 6 percent have adminone of the plaintiffs in Glucksberg.)
. )stE!re,~.al~~h~l~Il)ject.ion or written a
It is hard to believe that any group fa'<·l~®4~~~~i~p~n least once.
voring PAS would retain this requirement ·;:;,·:,;:::·I1~~~~~~~~·~~~ ~t~ce•before ()regon
if the Court were to establish a constitu- ·. . '\$~~~~(9~~~ tneJJ~ath with Dignity
tional right to assisted suicide. But one can ':. Act: !Nov~m~~.:r 111~.7, Vot~rs had
be fairly sure that if the Court were to es-

ployees, and public funds. 30
Although not insubstantial, the differences among proponents of PAS over the
requisite conditions and procedures for
carrying out the practice pale compared to
the differences likely to exist between PAS
proponents and those opposed to legalizing any PAS at all. In short, in many respects the legislative response to a
Supreme Court decision establishing a

Few physicians assist patient suicides

•.

in

at

passed the act in 1994, but the state legislature asked for a repeal last year. Instead, 60 percent of voters reaffirmed
the act.
Under the act, doctors may prescribe
deadly doses of barbiturates and other
drugs to adults of sound mind who have
been given less than six months to live.
The act applies only to Oregon residents. According to an article in The
Washington Post onApril29, 1998, the
act requires oral and written requests,
consulting opinions by other physicians, a 15-day waiting period, and notification of pharmacists and state
health authorities.
After the request is approved, the
physician prescribes a fatal drug the patient may take at his or her discretion
with or without a doctor present. Physicians may not give lethal injections.
Opponents fear the act will lead to a
rash of suicides by patients with treatable diseases. However, in the sixmonth period since the act took effect,
Compassion in Dying Federation, anational advocacy group headquartered in
Oregon that counsels the terminally ill
on assisted suicide, confirmed only 15
requests by patients seeking assisted
suicide. Of those, seven patients' requests are being processed, four patients have died of natural causes, three
patients were found ineligible for assistance, and one patient died after taking
a lethal dose of barbiturates. Only one
other case of physician-assisted suicide
has been reported.
-Jennifer L. Reicherl
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right to assisted suicide is likely to be areplay of the response to Roe v. Wade, 31 a
specter that did not escape the attention of
the justices last year.
At one point in the oral arguments,
Rehnquist told the lead lawyer for the
Glucksberg plaintiffs:
You're not asking that [this Court engage in
legislation] now. But surely that's what the
next couple of generations are going to have
to deal with, what regulations are admissible
and what not if we uphold your position here.
. . . [Y]ou're going to find the same thing ...
that perhaps has happened with the abortion
cases, there are people who are just totally opposed and people who are totally in favor of
them. So you're going to have those factions
fighting it out in every session of the legisla·
ture-how far can we go in regulating this.
And that will be a constitutional decision in
every case.32

Roe v. Wade ignited what has aptly been
called a "domestic war,"33 one that, after a
quarter-century of tumult, seems finally to
have come to an end in the courts. The

Court that decided the assisted suicide
cases in 1997 was not eager to set off a new
domestic war. I venture to say that the
Court will not be eager to do so the next
time around either.
D
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